Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text:

"If I agree to judge a text according to pleasure, I cannot go on to say: this one is good, that bad. No awards, no 'critique', for this always implies a tactical aim, a social usage, and frequently an extenuating image-reservoir. I cannot apportion, imagine that the text is perfectible, ready to enter into a play of normative predicates: it is too much this, not enough that; the text (the same is true of the singing voice) can wring from me only this judgement, in no way adjectival: that's it! And further still: that's it for me! This 'for me' is neither subjective nor existential, but Nietzschean ('...basically, it is always the same question: What is it for me?...')."

My immediate questions: Always? Can one see all ways? How absolute is this Nietzschean "for me"? What happens when one sees "for me" as, first and foremost, "to me"? Barthes' "judgement" seems to mark a beginning (a picking up of a contextural thread) of inquiry, where "judgement" elsewhere--especially in the context of law--implies an end or, rather, a stoppage, i.e., the "act" of stopping, when an end is not an end but at once gesture and fiction.

I've got nothing "better" to think about at the moment.